With its decision in the consolidated cases Trump v. V.O.S. Selections (No. 25‑250) and Learning Resources v. Trump (No. 24‑1287), the Supreme Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the president to impose tariffs. The court concluded that IEEPA’s grant of authority to “regulate … importation” cannot be read to include the power to levy duties or taxes, an authority the Constitution assigns exclusively to Congress. It emphasized that IEEPA’s detailed list of permitted actions omits any reference to tariffs or duties and that no president in the statute’s nearly 50‑year history had used it to impose tariffs.

The ruling will have a significant impact on the Trump administration’s “reciprocal” tariffs, ranging from 10% to over 50%, as well as its attempt to use IEEPA‑based tariffs to pressure China, Canada, and Mexico to curb illicit drug flows, including fentanyl. The court rejected those uses of IEEPA, concluding that such sweeping and economically transformative tariff authorities would require clear congressional authorization, which IEEPA does not provide. 

Despite this outcome, the decision does not overturn major tariffs imposed under other statutes because those measures were not based on IEEPA. Tariffs on steel, aluminum, autos, furniture, and other imports imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 remain in place, as do the extensive tariffs applied during President Trump’s first term on Chinese imports under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Additional sector‑specific tariff proposals remain pending and could still be pursued under authorities other than IEEPA, primarily Section 232.

In light of the court’s ruling, President Trump plans to rely more heavily on Sections 232 and 301, both of which explicitly delegate tariff authority and have historically been used by presidents to impose significant trade restrictions. While these statutes require specific procedural steps and impose substantive limits that IEEPA lacks, they remain viable channels for new tariffs. In the interim, the administration turned to a historically unused authority, Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, to introduce a global 15% tariff for up to 150 days.

The ruling also introduces uncertainty surrounding recently announced trade frameworks and bilateral understandings. While many trading partners entered negotiations under the pressure of potential IEEPA‑based tariffs, several deals included significant relief from Section 232 duties. Although the court’s decision removes the threat of expansive IEEPA tariffs, the continued availability of Section 232 and Section 301 authorities may still incentivize participating countries to uphold their commitments. The ultimate impact on these negotiated agreements remains to be seen.

The ruling may also have an impact, albeit temporarily, on the Trump administration’s move to suspend “de minimis” treatment for low-value shipments. The administration relied on IEEPA to suspend the ability of goods valued at or under $800 to enter the United States duty-free and instead subject these goods to applicable tariffs or separate fees. The court’s ruling did not directly address the impact on “de minimis.” Regardless, any impact will be short-lived as Congress largely eliminated the provision in the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (P.L. 119-21), effective July 1, 2027.

DECISION OVERVIEW

The Supreme Court ruled that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) does not authorize the president to impose tariffs. Although the statute empowers the president to “regulate … importation” during a declared national emergency, the court concluded that this phrase cannot plausibly be read to include the power to levy tariffs, an authority the Constitution places squarely and exclusively in Congress under Article I. The court emphasized that tariffs are a form of taxation, and nowhere in IEEPA’s detailed list of verbs such as “investigate,” “block,” “regulate,” "nullify," or “prohibit” did Congress include terms like “tariff,” “duty,” "tax," or any synonymous language indicating a delegation of its taxing power. The court also noted that in IEEPA’s nearly 50-year history, no president had ever used it to impose tariffs, and, more broadly, Congress has always delegated tariff authority explicitly and with tight constraints when it intended to do so.

The majority also held that the president’s claimed authority triggered the major questions doctrine, because the tariffs imposed under IEEPA were economically and politically momentous. For such extraordinary assertions of executive power, the court explained, clear congressional authorization is required, and IEEPA’s broad but nonspecific language falls short of that standard. Separately, several concurring justices agreed that ordinary statutory interpretation led to the same result, finding that “regulate importation” has never been understood to include the power to impose taxes, and the structure of IEEPA aligns with an emergency power to freeze or block foreign property, not to raise revenue from U.S. importers.

The court rejected counterarguments that pointed to earlier statutes or foreign affairs precedents. It found that the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) and the lower‑court decision in U.S. v. Yoshida (1975) did not establish a settled meaning that Congress incorporated into IEEPA and that wartime precedents did not apply because the president expressly disclaimed any inherent wartime authority and the nation was not at war. It further rejected claims that emergency or foreign-affairs contexts justified reading IEEPA broadly, reiterating that Congress alone controls tariff policy and that neither emergencies nor diplomatic considerations can justify inferring a sweeping delegation absent explicit statutory language.

Because IEEPA provided no such authorization, the court affirmed the Federal Circuit’s judgment in V.O.S. Selections, concluding the tariffs were unlawful. It vacated the district court decision in Learning Resources on jurisdictional grounds, directing that case to be dismissed. The decision ultimately reaffirms that tariff authority, an essential element of Congress’ taxing power, cannot be exercised by the president without a clear, express delegation of authority and that IEEPA’s broad emergency powers stop well short of allowing the executive to reshape U.S. tariff policy unilaterally.

IMPACT ON EXISTING TARIFFS

The Supreme Court ruling invalidates the following tariffs:

• 10% Baseline Tariff. The administration’s across‑the‑board 10% tariff, first imposed on April 5, 2025, and maintained for countries not subject to reciprocal tariffs, was grounded entirely in IEEPA and, therefore, cannot stand. The court held that IEEPA’s authority to “regulate … importation” does not include the power to tax imports, making the baseline tariff invalid.

• Country-Specific Reciprocal Tariffs. These tariffs, intended to respond to long-standing trade deficits and applied at rates ranging from 15% to 41% as of August 7, 2025, also relied on IEEPA. Because the president lacks tariff authority under IEEPA irrespective of national emergency declarations, these reciprocal tariffs are invalid as well.

• Trafficking Tariffs. President Trump’s February 1, 2025, declaration that fentanyl importation constituted a national security emergency led to a series of trafficking-related tariffs on Canada, Mexico, and China. These included a 25% (later 35%) tariff on certain Canadian and Mexican goods failing United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) rules of origin, as well as a 10% tariff on all Chinese imports. The Supreme Court held that IEEPA provides no authority for the president to impose tariffs of any kind, even in response to an “unusual and extraordinary threat,” rendering the trafficking tariffs unlawful.

The following tariffs are not affected by the Supreme Court ruling and are still in effect:

• Section 232 Tariffs. Tariffs imposed under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, including the 50% tariff on steel, aluminum, and copper and the 25% tariff on automobiles, heavy-duty vehicles, lumber, and timber, remain valid because Section 232 expressly authorizes the president to adjust imports for national security reasons. Any future tariffs the administration may impose on pharmaceuticals, critical minerals, semiconductors, or smartphones under Section 232 would likewise be unaffected.

• Section 301 Tariffs. Tariffs imposed on Chinese goods during President Trump’s first term under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 also remain in effect. The Supreme Court’s ruling does not disturb these measures because Section 301 authorizes retaliatory duties in response to unfair trade practices.

ALTERNATIVE TARIFF AUTHORITIES

Statute	Authority	Limitation
Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962	This statute empowers the president to impose tariffs on a strategic good following a Department of Commerce investigation that determines such a product’s importation threatens the national security of the United States.	Due to the fact that Section 232 requires an investigation and must be tied to national security concerns, the Trump administration would be unable to invoke the authority to impose sweeping tariffs on a wide range of goods.
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974	This statute grants expansive authority to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate and then remedy “unfair” trade practices, including by way of tariffs.	USTR would need to individually investigate countries, and the tariff USTR imposed would be limited to the value of the burden being imposed on U.S. industry.
Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930	This statute enables the president to impose new and additional tariffs of up to 50% ad valorem on foreign imports from countries “discriminating” against U.S. commerce.	Section 338 requires an investigation, which can be initiated by the U.S. government or by a private petition to the International Trade Commission. However, the statute has never been used to impose tariffs.
Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974	This statute enables the president to impose import quotas and surcharges of up to 15% on any country or group of countries with whom the United States has a “large and serious” trade deficit.	Section 122 has never been used to impose tariffs or other trade restrictions and is limited to 150 days (unless expanded by Congress).
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974	This statute enables the president to grant temporary import relief (in the form of trade barriers) to protect domestic industries that are seriously injured or threatened by increased imports.	Section 201 requires a petition to be submitted, triggering an ITC investigation that culminates in a report to the president recommending a course of action. The president can impose recommended measures for an initial period of up to four years and extend for a maximum of eight years.

 

The administration will pursue a suite of the authorities listed above to continue rebalancing the trade scales. In the short term, the president has invokeed Section 122 to introduce a 15% global tariff. He may also use Section 338 to impose higher duties on countries where securing negotiating leverage is a top priority, such as China.

Separately, the Trump administration will likely expedite existing Section 232 investigations to impose tariffs on strategic goods. Nine Section 232 investigations remain outstanding, leaving the door open to future tariffs on goods ranging from semiconductors to medical equipment. Section 301 investigations regarding China’s and Brazil’s trade practices are also underway, and USTR could quickly initiate investigations into other trading partners. Sections 232 and 301 provide the Trump administration with a strong legal basis to impose tariffs, but these statutes cannot be deployed quickly due to their required investigations.

REFUNDS

IEEPA‑based tariffs generated billions of dollars in revenue, and the Trump administration may now face the task of refunding those amounts to affected importers. Because the Supreme Court held that IEEPA does not authorize the president to impose tariffs, every duty collected under that authority lacks a valid statutory basis. However, the court did not address whether refunds are required, nor did it provide guidance on how refunds should be administered. As a result, both the legal obligation to return the funds and the mechanics of repayment remain unresolved.

Given the unprecedented scale and structure of President Trump’s IEEPA‑based tariff regime, any refund mechanism will take a significant amount of time to design and implement. Hundreds of importers have already filed lawsuits before the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) to preserve their rights to restitution. In response to the flood of filings, the CIT issued an administrative stay for all IEEPA‑related refund cases filed on or after December 24, 2025. The order froze all unassigned cases seeking refunds until a “final, unappealable decision” from the Supreme Court.

With the Supreme Court now having invalidated every IEEPA‑based tariff, the CIT’s administrative stay is lifted. As a result, both previously filed and newly filed refund actions may now proceed. The CIT will play a central role in determining not only which importers are entitled to refunds but also how repayment will be calculated and administered in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling.

NEXT STEPS

The tariff landscape will remain highly fluid for the foreseeable future. The White House may move quickly to announce new tariffs under alternative statutory authorities in an effort to maintain leverage over trading partners. At the same time, federal agencies such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Department of the Treasury may soon issue guidance regarding potential refund processes.